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ABSTRACT

This paper is an experimental economic study that
serves two main functions.

The first of these is to provide

a replication of the findings of Schotter and Weigelt: that
when an equal opportunity or affirmative action program is
imposed, the effort levels of all employees tend to increase
and not just the effort of the parties discriminated
against.

Secondly, this study looks into the differences

between the effort levels shown by men and women in similar
situations.
The hypothesis of this paper is that while the effort
of all individuals is lowered in the presence of
discrimination, the effort levels of the females drop more
than male effort levels.
Three experiments were conducted at Eastern Illinois
University.

The first was a ten round tournament used to

measure effort levels in the absence of discrimination.

The

second was a ten round unfair tournament with
discrimination.

The final experiment was a twenty round

unfair tournament with discrimination.
The results of this set of experiments imply two
things.

The first major result of this study is that the
i

work of Schotter and Weigelt was replicated.

This provides

a basis from which to expand into an investigation of the
area of gender differences in effort levels.
the second major result of this research.

This leads to

The experiments

show that when no discrimination is present there is no
significant difference between the effort of males and
females.

This research also shows that when a

discrimination factor is present, women exhibit less effort
than their male counterparts in some situations.

This

difference is most significant when the women were in the
disadvantaged category.
The results of this study provide a good beginning for
research into the area of gender differences in effort
levels, which is an area that currently does not have much
empirical information available.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
In the past thirty years, the use of experimental
economics as a research method has increased in popularity
and acceptance.

However, it is still a relatively new

method with many research topics still to be explored
through laboratory analysis.

Experiments have provided a

way to replicate results that have not been available
otherwise (Davis and Holt, 1993, p. 44).

They also provide

an inexpensive (relative to the real world) method for
studying behavior.

When conducting experiments it is

important to first plan out every stage of the experiment
and determine all that will be needed.

This includes the

experimental design, arranging for colleagues to assist,
preparation of all the necessary materials, recruiting of
subjects, and finally conducting the actual experiment
(Davis and Holt, pp. 55-60}.
This paper will be a replication and expansion of an
experiment and research which was originally conducted by
Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt at New York University
(1992).

Their purpose was to determine if affirmative

action laws and equal opportunity laws lead to increases in
the amount of effort exerted by the affected workers.

They
1

examined the effects of equal opportunity and affirmative
action programs through the use of game theory and
tournaments.
Schotter and Weigelt theorized that increased effort
will be displayed by all employees of the firm when either
equal opportunity or affirmative action programs are
imposed. If their theory is correct, then there is no tradeoff between equity benefits and the supposed efficiency
losses.

This may occur because both equity and efficiency

are improved (Schotter and Weigelt, 1992, p. 511).
This expansion of Schotter and Weigelt's research will
compare the effort levels of males and females.

Schotter

and Weigelt did not break down their results by subject
gender to investigate differences.

It is expected that when

faced with the discrimination situation, the females will
tend to show a decreased level of effort (relative to a nondiscriminatory situation), and their effort will be less
than the effort that is shown by the males.

This hypothesis

is based on the notion that even though women continue to
increase in number in the workforce, and receive increasing
amounts of pay, they are still discriminated against in the
workplace.

This discrimination in turn may result in a lack

of trying to overcome these obstacles, even when assistance
is provided through government policy, such as affirmative
action and equal opportunity laws.
There is much evidence of discrimination against women.
2

The most obvious is that of pay inequality.

Barbara R.

Bergman found that in the United States the difference in
wages between white women and men is greater than the gap
between white men and black men (Cited in Amsden, 1980, p.
275).

Bergman goes on to note that any reduction in the

discrimination would probably lead to lower wages for the
men instead of increasing wages for the women (Amsden, p.
275).

This same study also found that employers can either

gain or lose financially through this type of
discrimination.

When women are discriminated against in

this manner, their wages are lowered and at the same time
the wages of men are increased (Amsden, p. 278).

The pay

inequality is shrinking, but the changes are occurring
slowly.

The ratios of women's to men's earnings can be seen

in Figure 1.
In addition, there are many social myths regarding
women in the workplace that are slow to disappear.
example, there is the Myth of Role Conflict.

For

This is the

belief that a "great" conflict will exist for any woman who
seeks a career outside of her "true vocation" as a housewife
and mother (Blaxall and Reagan, 1976, p. 33).

Barbara Ann

Stolz (1985) found that within the family environment there
are many factors that contribute to women having a hard time
defeating the status quo.

For example, childrens' actions

that, deliberate or not, were effective in keeping their
mother at home, or the lack of adequate day care provided by
3
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for full-time wage and salary workers by age (U.S.
Department of Labor, 1991, p. 22)
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society (Stolz, p. 123).

Stolz also noted that usually

women were faced with deliberate attempts by their husbands
to keep them at home.

Also, many responsibilities, such as

school meetings and sick children, place demands on women
that cannot be accommodated by the traditional job (Stolz,
p. 124).

These are reasons women may face discrimination in

the workplace.

This can occur in two ways.

First, a female

job candidate may be less likely to be hired than an equally
(or even less) qualified male candidate because the employer
may feel that a man is less likely to take time off to care
for children.

The assumption is made that the woman would

miss more time from work, and therefore be less productive
for the company.

Secondly, a woman may feel penalized at

work when they do need to take time off.

This time off may

be seen by their male co-workers and bosses as getting a
break from work to take care of children, a break that the
males would not take.

As a result the women may be

perceived as not as committed, responsible, or as hard
working as the males.

As a result women may be assigned

tasks/jobs with lower responsibility, be paid less and
receive fewer promotions than men do.
Another major myth is that females suffer from
motivational deficit and have a lack of commitment to their
chosen career (Blaxall and Reagan, 1976, p. 35).

Jacquelyn

B. James studied this area and discovered that women allow
for career interruption (especially during the childrearing
5

years) when they are selecting a career (Cited in Grossman,
l990, p. 106).

James found evidence that women who plan to

interrupt their careers at some point tend to make their
career choice based on how easy it will be to interrupt
their career instead of choosing based upon their own
interests and abilities (Grossman, p. 106).
to discrimination situations.

This may lead

The women may be passed over

for promotions, or not given responsibilities that are given
to their equivalent male co-workers.

As a result of being

in a job which is not their first choice, women may not try
as hard to do their best work or exert any extra effort to
overcome the burdens of discrimination at the workplace.
Another explanation for any difference in the effort
levels of men and women is the tendency for women to be
externalizers (Wallace, 1982, p. 72).

This means that they

attribute things that affect them to luck or chance instead
of their own actions.

Men on the other hand have a tendency

to be internalizers, which is, they tend to believe that
events are the result of their own actions.

Men are also

more likely to attribute their success to their actions and
failure to external events where as women attributed success
to external factors and failure to their own actions
(Wallace, p. 72).
Wallace (1982) states that "women often assume that men
are more apt to attain promotions and higher management
positions because of the 'old boys' network' and bias that
6

exists against women" (p. 95).

This factor may also

contribute to the decrease in effort shown by women.

If

they believe that they will not be able to overcome the
disadvantage, then they may not exert any extra effort to
attain success in spite of equal opportunity and affirmative
action programs.
In this study, tournaments are used to collect data on
employee effort.

In a tournament, subject payments depend

on their performance relative to that of another subject in
the experiment.
asymmetric.

Tournaments can be either symmetric or

Symmetric tournaments exist when all subjects

are relatively identical and are treated equally.

According

to O'Keefe, Viscusi, and Zekhauser, 1984, there are two
types of asymmetric tournaments, uneven and unfair (Cited in
Weigelt, Dukerich, and Schotter,

1989, p. 23).

Tournaments

are uneven when subjects differ in ability, and are unfair
when the rules favor one subject over another (Cited in
Weigelt et al., p. 23).
Clive Bull found that rank-order tournaments are good
predictors of the behavior of effort levels of laboratory
subjects (1987, p. 2).

Bull found that disadvantaged

subjects in uneven tournaments have higher effort levels
than originally expected (p. 3). In his study, Bull designed
an experiment that consisted of 10 separate sessions with
different subjects and parameters for each.

The results of

these tournaments indicate that systematic behavior is shown
7

by subjects in a tournament (Bull, p. 28).

This finding is

important to note for the current study because it allows
for application and interpretation of the results of the
current tournament to the outside world.
The experiments conducted for this paper will be a
replication of the experiments that Schotter and Weigelt
conducted.

The purpose of this is to establish that

Schotter and Weigelt's results are replicable and to extend
their results.

The current study will then expand on the

original study in the interpretation and analysis of the
data. This study will explore the theory that female workers
tend to exert less effort than do their male counterparts in
the same situation.

There has been no experimental study

found which investigates the existence of a difference in
the effort levels exerted by men and women.

If there is a

notable difference, then a whole new area of investigation
will be wide open.

SCHOTTER AND WEIGELT'S WORK
To perform their experiment, Schotter and Weigelt
(1992) recruited subjects from economics courses.

At the

beginning of the experiment, subjects were told to select
envelopes, were given the instructions, and were randomly
assigned seats, subject numbers, and anonymous tournament
pair members.

Then to start each round, the subjects were

asked to select a number between

o

and 100.

This was
8

recorded on their sheet as their "decision number" (a proxy
for their effort level).

For each decision number there was

a corresponding cost, listed on a table that was handed out
to the subjects.

After the subject had recorded his/her

decision number, he/she opened one of the envelopes he/she
selected upon entering the room.

Each envelope contained a

random number (a proxy for a random shock), and added it to
the decision number which gave the subject a total number (a
proxy for the subject's total output) for the round.
information was collected by the experimenter.

This

The member

of each tournament pair with the highest total number
received a higher payment than the subject in the pair with
the lower total number.

In the event of a tie a coin was

tossed to decide which pair member was to be designated as
having the highest total number.
their payoffs on their sheets.
procedure for 20 rounds.

The subjects then recorded
Subjects repeated this

The average duration of the

experiments was about 75 minutes (p. 518).
experiments were conducted in all.
baseline, symmetric tournament.

Seven

The first was a

The second and third were

unfair tournaments in which one member of each subject pair
had to exceed the other's output by 25 (or 45) before he/she
could receive the higher payment.

In these two experiments,

the subject knew if he/she was the disadvantaged pair
member.

Experiments four and five were uneven tournaments

which were identical to the baseline except that the costs
.9

of one pair member is a multiple of the other's.
Experiments six and seven examine the effects of affirmative
action programs.

This is achieved by combining the

parameters of experiment 4 with a disadvantage factor of 25
(experiment 6), and, for experiment 7, the parameters of
experiment 5 with a disadvantage factor of 45 (p. 522).
Schotter and Weigelt's results were consistent with the
predictions of the tournament theory (discussed later in
this chapter).

For their baseline experiment, the mean

effort level, 77.9, was not significantly different from the
predicted level of 73.75.

The unfair experiment showed that

while effort levels fell relative to the symmetric
tournament, they were higher than the theory predicted: the
mean effort level of disadvantaged subjects was 58.65
(predicted level 58.39) and the mean effort level of
advantaged subjects was 74.5 (predicted level 58.39)
(Schotter and Weigelt, pp. 522-23).

Noting the increase in

mean effort levels (from the unfair tournament to the
symmetric tournament) , Schotter and Weigelt conclude that
equal opportunity laws benefit the disadvantaged groups.
Also, equal opportunity laws actually improve the overall
tournament performance.

These results further suggest that

the effect of affirmative action programs on output depends
upon the degree of discrimination that exists (p. 539).
As a final note Schotter and Weigelt observed two
behavioral tendencies that were persistent in their
10

research; variance in behavior among the different subjects
and the slight oversupply of effort.

Schotter and Weigelt

recommended that future research focus on these two areas.
The main focus of this paper will be in the expansion
of the results of Schotter and Weigelt along the lines of
the variance in subject behavior. This will be done to
determine if men and women exert different levels of effort.
For this study, some parts of Schotter and Weigelt's
original work will be eliminated and others will be
shortened or changed.

These changes will be noted as they

are discussed in the paper.
For this study there will be three basic null
hypotheses and alternatives used to test these theories.
The first null hypothesis is that the data from this study
are not significantly different from the prediction of game
theory.

The second null hypothesis is that the data from

this study are not significantly different from Schotter and
Weigelt's data.

The last null hypothesis is that the mean

effort of males is equal to that of females.
This thesis will proceed as follows.
tournaments will be discussed next.

The theory of

In Chapter 2 the

experimental procedure and design for this study will be
presented.

Chapter 3 will present and discuss the results.

Finally, in Chapter 4 conclusions will be drawn and
suggestions will be made for further research in this area.
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THE THEORY OF TOURNAMENTS

The following information deals with the theory behind
subjects' expected behavior in tournaments, and also in the
calculation of the payoff functions for the tournaments
(Schotter and Weigelt, 1992, pp. 514-518):
Consider the following two-person tournament.
identical agents i

Two

and j have the following utility

functions that are separable in the payment received
and the effort exerted:

Udp, e) = u (p) -c (e);

(1)
~(p,e)

=

u(p)-ac(e),

where p denotes the nonnegative payment to the agent,
e, a scaler, is the agent's nonnegative effort, and a
>l is a constant.

Note that agent j's costs are a

times those of agent i, a >1.

The positive and

increasing functions u(.) and c(.) are, respectively,
concave and convex.

Agent i

provides a level of effort

that is not observable and that generates an output

~

according to

12

Yi

=

f (ei)

+

(2)

€i,

where the production function f(.)
a random shock.

is concave and

Agent j has a similar technology and

simultaneously makes a similar decision.
to agent i

is

€i

The payment

is M>O, if Yi>Yi + k, and m<M if Yi<Yi + k,

where k is a constant.

A positive k indicates that j

is favored in the tournament, while a negative k
indicates that i

is favored. Agent j

faces the same

(actually similar, but mirror image) payment scheme.
Given any pair of effort choices by agents, agent i's
probability of winning M, ~(~,~,k), is just equal to
the probability that

(f;-fi)

> f (e1)

-

f (ei)

+ k.

Thus,

i's expected payoff from such a choice is

while agent j's is

(3)

The above equations specify a game with payoffs given
by (1) and a strategy set E given by the feasible set
of effort choices.

The theory of tournaments restricts
13

itself to the game's pure Nash equilibria.
distribution of (Ei -

If the

is degenerate either because

E)

there are no random shocks to output or because such
shocks are perfectly correlated across agents, and k is
not too large, then the game has no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
With suitable restrictions on the distribution of
random shocks and the utility functions, a unique, pure
strategy Nash equilibrium will exist.

This is the

behavioral outcome predicted by the theory of
tournaments.

The theory requires the specification of

the utility function, the production function, the
distribution of (Ei -

Ei),

and prizes M and m.

One

simple specification is the following:

U; ( g, e;)

=

ui (pi, ei)

=

P; -

e// c

pi -

a.ei2 /c

( 1 ')

1= i,j,

where c>O and

E1

(2,)

is distributed uniformly over the

interval [-a,+a], a>O, and independently across the
agents.

~and~

are restricted to lie in [O, 100].

In this particular case the agents' expected payoff in
14

the tournament is given by

(3,)

If a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is in
the interior of [O, 100], each agents first-order
condition must be fulfilled:

oEzi

0
•
•
= 1T(ei,e1 ,k)

oei
oEz1

2e.·
1 _
[M-m]-_

=o1T(e/,e/,k)

oej

=

o;

c

oei

[M-m]-

a.2e1•

(4)

=O.

c

oe1

The concavity of the agent's payoff function ensures
that (4) is sufficient for a maximum. (A corner
solution must be checked for).
assumptions on

€i

and

€1,

Given distributional

the probability of winning

functions with k>O is

15

J
2

1

e,_- k - e1 (e+- k - e/
- 2 a - - Ba'

, if ~-k > e1

_(z -e, - e, - k - (e, - e, - k)') otherwise,
~ ~

Ba'

(5)
1 - e,

i
1

+ k - elj. (e, + k - eJ' if e;+k > e,

~

_p - e, - e; - k -

t

8a'
(e, - "i - k)' \_rherwise;

----i;-

8a'

i

with

01Tj(•)

=

-

e.
J

-

2a

oei
o1Ti (• J

1

=

1
2a

oei

e; + k

if

ei+k >e;,

4a 2

_e;

-

ei

+

(6)

k

if

ei+k <ei,

4a 2

and

1

=
2a

4a 2
(7)

1

=
2a

4a 2

16

Note that the marginal probability of winning is
equal for both agents, regardless of the value of k,
and this probability is a function only of the
difference in effort levels (including k).

It does not

depend on absolute effort levels.
Plugging (6) and (7) into (4) and solving for e;·
and ei·, we find that

[ (1/2a)
1

When k =

o

+

and a

-

(k/4a 2 ) ] (c(M-m) /2a)

[(1-a)/4a 2 }(c(M-m)/2a)

=

1,

(8)

(8) defines the equilibrium

of a symmetric tournament with

e;·

When a

=

=

e/

=

(c(M-m))/4a.

1 and k > o,

(9)

(8) defines the equilibrium

of an unfair tournament with

. .

e;=ei= _1_
2a

k
4a 2

c(M-m)
2

(10)

17

Note in unfair tournaments, despite j's advantage,
at equilibrium both agents choose the same effort
level.

The logic underlying this result is simple.

As noted in (6) and (7), the marginal probability of
winning function for any k and effort levels e 1 and

~

are equal for both advantaged and disadvantaged
subjects and depends only on the difference between
~

+ k and

e 1•

Because their marginal probability

winning functions are equal at all e 1 and
i

and j

~'

and both

have identical cost functions, the same

effort level that equates the marginal benefits of
increased effort to marginal costs for i, also does
so for j.

Hence, at equilibrium both choose the same

effort level.

Effort levels fall when k is increased

from O (i.e., the symmetric equilibrium) because such
an increase in k decreases the marginal probability
of winning for both agents at each e 1 and

~-

We compare equations (9) and (10) to investigate
the effect of equal opportunity laws.

The ceteris

paribus removal of discrimination (k is reduced from
k>O to k=O} increases the equilibrium effort levels of
both agents and hence the profits of the tournament
administrator.

Again, the probability of winning for

agents who are discriminated against increases.
However, equal opportunity laws can decrease the
18

welfare of these agents because they are expected to
exert more effort at equilibrium.

A negative welfare

gain results if the cost of this increased effort
exceeds the expected benefits of winning.

Welfare gain

is, of course, always expected to be negative for
previously favored agents.
The work in this paper should provide a contribution to
the area of experimental economics as well as to the area of
labor economics.

This will be accomplished by first

replicating Schotter and Weigelt's work to provide a basis
for expanding this work into the area of gender differences.
If the study shows a significant difference in the effort
levels that are expended by males and females in various
situations, the possibilities for further study in this area
will be numerous.

19

CHAPTER 2

METHOD
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

All of the experiments for this study used subjects
recruited from economics courses at Eastern Illinois
University.

The baseline experiment consisted of ten

subjects, eight others participated in the first
discrimination experiment, and a third set of ten subjects
participated in the second discrimination experiment.

When

the subjects arrived at the laboratory (a standard 40-seat
classroom) they were given a packet of information and asked
to pick 10 envelopes from a container of 200.

In the second

discrimination experiment, subjects selected 20 envelopes
from a pile of 240.

Inside the envelopes was a number

written on a slip of paper.

The numbers were randomly

selected from a uniform distribution over the range (-60,
+60) and were generated using Lotusl23 @functions.

Each

subject was randomly assigned a seat, a subject number, and
a "pair member" for the duration of the experiment.

The

identity of the pair member was not revealed to the subject
at any time.
The packets given to the subjects included written
instructions, a decision number/costs table, a payoff record
20

sheet, and a set of small slips that were collected at the
end of each round to determine who in the pair was to
receive the high payment.

The instructions and other

sheets were those used by Schotter and Weigelt in their
experiments, and were obtained from Dr. Schotter.

Copies

appear in the Appendix of this paper.
The subjects were told in the instructions that the
amount of money they earned was a function of their
decisions, their pair member's decisions, and the
realization of a random variable.

All parameters (including

if they were the advantaged/disadvantaged member of their
pairing) in the experiments were known to the subjects
except for the identity of a subject's pair member.
The instructions and the format of the experiment was
explained thoroughly to the subjects, and then the
experiment began.

In all three experiments, subjects were

told to first select a number from the decision/cost sheet
which listed numbers between

o

and 100 (inclusive) and then

record this number on their payoff record sheet.
their "decision number".

This was

Next to each decision number was

the associated cost of that "effort".

After a subject

recorded his/her decision number and its cost on his/her
payoff sheet, he/she was instructed to open one of the 10
envelopes with a random number enclosed.

This number was

then recorded on the payoff sheet and was added to the
decision number to get a "total number" for that round.
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This total number was then recorded on one of the small
slips of paper that were then collected.

The "total

numbers" of each pair were then compared, the experimenter
then indicated on each slip whether the subject received the
high or low payment, and the slips were returned to the
subjects.

In the event of a tie (which did not occur in

any of these experiments) a fair coin would be tossed to
determine which subject in the pair received the high
payment.

Each subject then circled either the high or low

payment on his/her payoff record sheet.

He/she then

subtracted the cost of his/her decision number from his/her
payment amount.
for that round.

This amount is the subject's net payment
The decision number in these experiments

corresponds to effort, the random number corresponds to the
random shock, the total number corresponds to output, and
finally the decision cost corresponds to the disutility of
effort.

After this was completed, the next round began.

The rounds were all identical and the subjects proceeded in
this manner for 10 rounds in the first two experiments and
for 20 rounds in the third experiment.

After the last round

was completed, subjects calculated their total payment by
summing the payments for each round.

This payment value was

then divided by 2 (which the subjects knew was to occur) to
determine their actual payment in dollars. In the third
experiment, subjects also then subtracted a $2.00 "fixed
cost" from the total to determine their actual total
22

payment. (The subtraction of the fixed cost more closely
replicated Schotter and Weigelt's experiment.)
The first and second sessions lasted approximately 45
minutes from start to finish, and the third session lasted
about 1 hour.
For the second and third experiments, which had a
disadvantage factor of 25, the instructions differed
slightly from those in the baseline experiment.

The

subjects all had identical cost functions, but in each
subject pair, one person had to realize an output that was k
units greater than that of his/her pair member in order to
receive the higher payment.

For the experiments, the

subject in each pair with an even number was the
disadvantaged subject.

The value of the disadvantage

factor, k (=25), was known to all of the subjects.
is important to note a few things.

Here, it

Subjects that received

the high payment were referred to as "high number subjects"
instead of "winners".

Also, M and m, the high and low

payments, were not referred to as "prizes" but as "fixed
payments".

The reasoning behind this, according to Schotter

and Weigelt (1992), was to "deemphasize the gamelike nature
of the experiment and reduce the possibility that winning
might affect the decision of subjects independently of
payoffs" (p. 519).

The second thing to note is that the

subjects were only allowed to participate in one of the
experiments, not all three.

This was to avoid the subjects
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from having carryover effects from one experiment to the
other (p. 520).
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Three experiments were conducted to investigate the
effect of discrimination on the behavior of the subjects.
The parameters of the experiments can be seen in Table 1.
The first, baseline, experiment was a symmetric
tournament that had no disadvantaged members.

This would be

used to measure any changes that show up in the second and
third experiments.

Experiment 2 was to test the effect of

unfairness, and so, the output of one member of each subject
pair had to exceed the other member's by 25 before the
subject could receive the higher fixed payment, M.

Since

this was the only parameter that was changed, the comparison
with the baseline experiment will illustrate the effects of
the discrimination treatment (equal opportunity laws).

The

third experiment was identical to the second, except that
there were twenty rounds instead of ten.
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TABLE 1
EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS
EXPERIMENT#
DECISION
COST
RANDOM
#RANGE FUNCTION #RANGE

M

m

(M-m)
EQUILIURIUM
ADVANTAGED DISADVANTAGED

I k=O

(0-100)

e,'/15000 (-60,60) 2.04

.86

1.18

73.75

73.75

2 k=25

(0-100)

c,'/15000 (-60,60) 2.04

.86

1.18

58.39

58.39

3 k=25

(0-100)

c,2115000 (-60,60) 2.04

.86

1.18

58.39

58.39
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CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

COMPARISON TO THEORY

The data are summarized in Table 2.

These data are

analyzed to determine if they agree with theory.
Wilcoxon test is used for this determination.

The

The Wilcoxon

test assumes the observations are drawn from a symmetric
distribution.

To test the validity of this observation, the

Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to determine if the data
could have been drawn from a normal distribution.

The K-S

test is applied to all observations to which the Wilcoxon
and Mann-Whitney tests are applied (below) .

As can be seen

in Table 3, the hypothesis that the observations are drawn
from a normal distribution cannot be rejected for any of the
sets of data.

The results from the Wilcoxon test are

reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.

The hypothesis that

the observations are not significantly different from the
theoretical effort levels is rejected in three of the seven
treatments: the overall mean effort levels from the subjects
in Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and the mean effort level of
the advantaged subjects in Experiment 2.

For the

disadvantaged subjects in Experiment 2 and all the subjects,
26

Table 2.

EXRerimental Results: Means and standard deviations
Mean Decision Numbers

Mean standard Deviations

Round
1-10

Round
11-20

Round
1-20

Round
1-10

73.75
73.75
73.75

63.95
66.1
60.775

58.39
58.39
58.39
58.39
58.39
58.39
58.39

47.0
62.925
41.1
84.30
31.08
27.85
·34.3

-------------------------

30.77
33.735
25.376

2 k=25
Male
Adv.
Dis.
Female
Adv.
Dis.

-----------------------------------------

3 k=25
Male
Adv.
Dis.
Female
Adv.
Dis.

58.39
58.39
58.39
58.39
58.39
58.39
58.39

58.96
55.94
54.54
57.7
86.1
86.1

Experiment
Number

Predicted
Effort

1

k=O
Male
Female

-----

Round
11-20

Round
1-20

-----

10
6
4

-------------------------

8
4
2
2
4
2
2
10
9
5
4
1
0
1

-----

34.73
34.027
27.276
24.881
27.327
24.164
29.813

-----------------------------------------

55.34
55.56
62.76
46.55
53.4

57.15
55.75
58.65
52.13
69.75

29.78
28 .114
26.61
29.79
29.44

28.85
27.84
20.93
32.42
43.52

29.31
27.97
23.77
31.10
36.48

53.4

69.75

29.44

43.52

36.48

-----

-------------

-----

------

-----

Number of
Subjects

---------

-----

-----

Table 3.
statistical Test Results

Experiment
Nwnber

K-S Test

1 k=O

.1429*

2k=25
Adv.
Dis.

.1486*
.1292*
.1306*

0
31

24*

3 k=25
Adv.
Dis.

.1132•
.1186*
.1186*

107
125
170

103*
85*
40*

*
**

K...

Wilcoxon(JG-n Mann-Whitney
Wilcoxon(M-F)
Swn of Ranks
(JG vsS&W)
Pos. Neg.
Pos. Neg.
~

5

50

2.95*

35

20*

0

55
55

4.35*
4.34*
-0.19

53
32

2
13**
1

3.83*
1.66•
4.34*

54
77
47

Swn of Ranks

133
163

indicates a failure to reject the null hypothesis at the .OS level
indicates a failure to reject the null hypothesis at the .10 level

in experiment 3, collectively and separately by
advantaged/disadvantaged group, the mean effort levels are
not significantly different from the predicted level.

THE REPLICATION

To determine if the results of this study did in fact
replicate that of Schotter and Weigelt, the Mann-Whitney
test was performed on the data.

This test is used to

compare data from independent random samples from two
populations.

This is used here to determine if the data

from the replication experiments are not significantly
different from the data that was reported by Schotter and
Weigelt.

The test was conducted on the overall mean effort

levels from all three subject pools and on the mean effort
levels of the disadvantaged, then advantaged subjects in
Experiments 2 and 3.

In all cases except the disadvantaged

subjects in Experiment 2, the null hypothesis that the two
sets of data are not significantly different cannot be
rejected.

The test statistics from the comparison of the

data from this study with the data of Schotter and Weigelt,
can be seen in column 5 of Table 3.

Figures 2 through 5

depict the mean effort levels generated by subjects in these
experiments (JG), Schotter and Weigelt's experiments (SW),
and the theoretical effort levels.

Figure 2 compares the

mean effort levels for the baseline experiments, and Figure
3 gives a comparison of mean effort levels of the subjects
29
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in the discrimination experiments.

Figure 4 presents the

comparison of mean effort levels of the advantaged subjects
and Figure 5 the disadvantaged.
As the statistical tests indicate, this replication of
Schotter and Weigelt's study proved to be successful and
will provide a good base from which to expand an
investigation of the area of the gender differences.

GENDER COMPARISON

To see if the differences in effort between the male
and female groups were significant, the Wilcoxon Test is
again used.

For this test the null hypothesis was that the

effort of males was not significantly different than that
shown by the females.

As the data recorded in columns 6 and

7 of Table 3 indicate, this hypothesis fails to be rejected
in Experiment 1 overall, and for Experiment 2 disadvantaged
subjects.
These experiments provide only slight support for the
theory that males display greater amounts of effort than are
displayed by females in the face of discrimination.

When

the three sets of experimental results are reviewed
independently, and with all their individual components, the
differences in effort between males and females becomes
obvious.

These differences can be seen graphically in

Figures 6, 7, and 8.

Figure 6 depicts a comparison of

male/female effort levels across all three experiments.

In
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Figure 7, the effort levels of the disadvantaged subjects
are compared, and in Figure 8 the advantaged.
The results of the Wilcoxon test, showed that the
effort levels of the males and females were not
significantly different in Experiment 1.

Perhaps this is

because in this experiment there was no discrimination
factor, all subjects were treated equally.

For Experiment

2, the mean effort levels of the male subjects were shown to
be significantly higher than those exhibited by the female
subjects.

The greatest difference in male/female effort

levels is seen among the disadvantaged subjects.

Among the

disadvantaged subjects, mean male effort was 84.30 and the
mean female effort was 34.30.
For Experiment 3, the Wilcoxon test showed that the
overall mean effort levels of the males and females were not
significantly different.

This may be partially explained by

the fact that there was only one female subject
participating in this experiment (in the disadvantaged
group) .

For this reason a gender comparison could not be

made among the advantaged subjects in Experiment 3.

This

also partially explains why for the disadvantaged subjects,
the Wilcoxon test found that the effort levels of the males
and females was not significantly different.

The results of

this experiment are shown in Figures 6 and 7 which compare
the mean effort level of the disadvantaged subjects, male
and female, and the advantaged subjects, male and female.
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To better incorporate the data of the third experiment,
the data were combined with that of Experiment 2.

The

Wilcoxon test was run for the combined data (rounds 1-10
were used) and the null hypotheis that there is no
significant difference between the effort levels of the
males and females was rejected.

This was tested using the

.05 level of significance (critical value= 11).

This

showed that in all three cases (male/female overall,
male/female disadvantaged, and male/female advantaged) that
there were significant differences in the male and female
effort levels.

When this was completed, the overall mean

effort levels were 50.93 for males and 43.96 for females.
For the advantaged males the mean effort level was 41.10 and
for the females in this category the mean effort level was
27.85.

The large differences are again evident in the means

for the disadvantaged group.

For the males, the mean effort

level was 84.75, and for the females 34.30.

This is shown

graphically in Figure 9.

PAYMENTS
The average payment to the subjects for the first
Experiment was $5.61.

Experiment 2 average payment was

$6.13, and Experiment 3 was $9.96.

The reason that the

payments are higher for Experiment 3 is because the number
of rounds was doubled to 20.

The average payment for the

whole set of experiments was $9.84.
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Figure 9. Experiments 2 and 3 combined.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION

The replication of Schotter and Weigelt was successful
and provided a base for an investigation into the area of
gender differences.

The study of gender differences gives

some support to the theory that male effort levels are
greater than female effort levels when faced with
discrimination.
The success of this study occurred in spite of a few
weaknesses.

First of all, due to limited funding the number

of subjects and the number of rounds for each experiment had
to remain low.

This should not affect the results as far as

the replication of the work of Schotter and Weigelt, however
it may have prevented the generation of effort levels that
matched the predicted levels and therefore, it is a reason
for caution in the interpretation of the results for the
comparison of the male/female effort level.

Subjects may be

just learning the game in the first 10 rounds as Schotter
and Weigelt suggested (1992).

It is also important to note

that all subjects were recruited from economics courses, a
factor that could cause a slight amount of selection bias in
the data.

This is because females are usually the minority
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in the field of Economics and those that choose this field
as a major have already shown a willingness to compete in a
male dominated area.

The results of this set of

experiments were also affected by the attitudes of the
subjects themselves.

In reading the post experiment

comments of the subjects, it was found that several of the
subjects just picked any decision number without giving the
choice any thought because they figured that they were going
to make money no matter what number they picked.

However,

none of these subjects decided to "drop out" (choose zero
effort level) for the duration of the tournament.
Another factor to consider is the lower payoffs in this
study compared to Schotter and Weigelt's study.

In spite of

this, most subjects were happy to participate in the study
and commented that they were receiving more than (in the
majority of cases twice as much as) the minimum wage for the
amount of time that the experiments took.
be an adequate incentive for the subjects.

This appeared to
All of these

factors, individually and in combination, may have had an
effect on the results with respect to Schotter and Weigelt's
theory and study.

Nevertheless, in the end, this

replication supports of the work of Schotter and Weigelt.
In the case of the gender differences in the effort
levels, this study weakly supports the theory that females
have lower effort levels when faced with a discrimination
factor but not when treated equally.

The fact that the
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workforce is changing, becoming more accepting of and more
fair to, women may cause the effort levels of men and women
to equalize, but it may take a long time before all the
myths and stereotypes which lead to discrimination can be
eliminated from the minds of workers and employers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that further research be conducted in
this area.

The findings here are a good start for an

investigation into the comparison of male and female effort
levels.

It should prove to be an important area in Labor

Economics.
A key point to mention is that if experiments such as
these are conducted, the research should be done as closely
to the original methods that were used by Schotter and
Weigelt for their study.
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APPENDIX

This appendix contains all the forms that were used to
complete all three experiments in this study.

They are

based upon those that were used and provided by Dr. Schotter
for his original study.
The order of the forms is as follows:
Instructions for Baseline
Instructions for Unfair Experiments
Sheet 1

Decision Cost Table

Sheet 2

Payoff Record Sheet

Payout Record Sheet
Post Experiment Survey
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Subject#~~~~~

Session#~~~~

INSTRUCTIONS
This

is

an

experiment

in

decision

making.

The

instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and
make good decisions, you could earn money which will be paid
to you in cash.
As you read these instructions, you will be in a room with a
number of other subjects.

Each subject has been randomly

assigned a subject number, which is located on the top right
of

this

sheet.

decision rounds.

The

experiment

consists

of

a

number

of

In each decision round, you will be paired

with another subject by a random drawing of subject numbers.
This will be called your pair member.
member

will

experiment.

be

the

same

subject

Note that your pair

throughout

the

entire

The identity of your pair member will not be

revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to your
pair member.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
In the experiment you will perform a simple task.

Attached to

these instruction sheets are two other sheets, labelled sheet
1 and sheet 2.
column A.

Sheet 1 shows 101 numbers, from o to 100 in

These are your decision numbers. Associated with

each number is a decision cost, which is listed in column B.
Note that the higher the decision number chosen the greater is
the associated cost.
Your pair member has an identical sheet.

In each round of the
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experiment,

you

and your

pair member will

decision number separately.

each

select

a

Record your number in column 1 of

sheet 2 and record its associated cost in column 5 of sheet 2.
Upon entering this room,
envelopes

from a

all subjects randomly selected 10

container holding hundreds of envelopes.

Each envelope contains a written number, whose value will fall
between

-60 and +60.

A series of numbers between -60 and +60

was randomly selected by a computer program, with each number
having an equal probability of being selected.

Each of these

numbers was then written on a sheet of paper, and put into an
envelope.
recorded

After you have selected your decision number, and
it AND

its cost on sheet 2,

select one of your

envelopes, open it, and record its enclosed number in column
2 of sheet 2.
paper

that

Then write this information on the slips of

were

provided

to

you.

These

will

then

be

collected.
CALCULATION OF PAYOFFS
Your payment in each round of the experiment will be computed
as follows.

You will add your decision number,

and random

draw number, and record this sum in column 3 of sheet 2.

Your

pair member will do the same.
Since all subjects have worked in privacy, the experimenter
will then compare the totals of you and your pair member
(which are on the slips of paper collected).

If you have an

even subject number, then your pair member will always have an
odd subject number, and vice versa.
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Your payoff (which is expressed in experimental dollars, E$)
is then determined.
Note:

to

convert

experimental

dollars

to

us dollars,

simply divide the experimental dollar value by 2.
PAYOFF DETERMINATION

If your column 3 total is greater than your pair member's, you
receive fixed payment "X" (E$2.04).
If your column 3 total is less than your pair member's, you
receive fixed payment "Y" (E$0.86)
If your column 3 total is equal to your pair member's, your
fixed payment will be either "X"

(E$2.04)

or "Y"

(E$0.86).

Which payment you receive will be determined by the flip of a
fair coin.

Circle the appropriate fixed payment in column 4,

and subtract from column 4 the cost associated with your
decision number listed in column 5.
column 6.
round.

Record this difference in

This amount in column 6 is your earnings for the

The earnings of your pair member are calculated in

exactly the same way.
perform the

After round one is completed, you will

same procedure.

That

is,

you will

choose a

decision number again (though of course, you may pick the same
one), you will open another envelope and record your random
draw number
payoff.

for

the round,

and you will

calculate a

new

When round 10 is completed, add your earnings from

each of the rounds and record the total earnings at the bottom
of sheet 2.

Then divide by 2 and this will be the amount that

will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment.
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Session#

Subject#~~~~~

~~~-

INSTRUCTIONS
This

is

an

experiment

in

decision

making.

The

instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and
make good decisions, you could earn money which will be paid
to you in cash.

As you read these instructions, you will be

in a room with a number of other subjects.

Each subject has

been randomly assigned a subject number, which is located on
the top right of this sheet.
The experiment consists of a number of decision rounds.

In

each decision round, you will be paired with another subject
by a random drawing of subject numbers.
your pair member.

This will be called

Note that your pair member will be the same

subject throughout the entire experiment.

The identity of

your pair member will not be revealed to you, nor will your
identity be revealed to your pair member.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
In the experiment you will perform a simple task.

Attached to

these instruction sheets are two other sheets, labelled sheet
1 and sheet 2.
column A.

Sheet 1 shows 101 numbers, from O to 100 in

These are your decision numbers. Associated with

each number is a decision cost, which is listed in column B.
Note that the higher the decision number chosen the greater is
the associated cost.

Your pair member has an identical sheet.

In each round of the experiment, you and your pair member will
each select a decision number separately.
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Record your number in column 1 of sheet 2 and record its
associated cost in column 5 of sheet 2.
Upon entering this room,
envelopes from a

all subjects randomly selected 10

container holding hundreds of envelopes.

Each envelope contains a written number, whose value will fall
between

-60 and +60.

A series of numbers between -60 and +60

was randomly selected by a computer program, with each number
having an equal probability of being selected.

Each of these

numbers was then written on a sheet of paper, and put into an
envelope.

After you have selected your decision number, and

recorded it AND its cbst on sheet 2,

select one of your

envelopes, open it, and record its enclosed number in column
2 of sheet 2.

Then write this information on the slips of

paper that were provided to you.
collected

along

with

the

These slips will then be

randomly

drawn

number

and

its

envelope.
CALCULATION OF PAYOFFS

•·
Your payment in each round of the experiment will be computed
as follows.

You will add your decision number and random draw

number, and record this sum in column 3 of sheet 2.
member will do the same.

Your pair

Since all subjects have worked in

privacy, the experimenter will then compare the totals of you
and

your

pair

collected).

member

(which

are

on

the

slips

of

paper

If you have an even subject number, then your

pair member will always have an odd subject number, and vice
versa.

Your

payoff

(which

is

expressed

in

experimental
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dollars, E$) is then determined.
Note:

to

convert

experimental

dollars

to

US

dollars,

simply divide the experimental dollar value by 2.

IF YOUR SUBJECT NUMBER IS ODD
If your column 3 total is greater than your pair member's, you
receive fixed payment "X" (E$2.04).
If your column 3 total is not more than 24 less than your pair
member's, you receive fixed payment "X" (E$2.04).
If your column 3 total is 25 less than your pair member's, a
fair coin will be flipped to determine whether you receive
fixed payment "X" (E$2.04) or "Y" (E$0.86).
If your column 3 total is less than your pair member's by 26
or more, you receive fixed payment "Y" (E$0.86).

NOTE:

Your column 3 total can be up to 25 less than your pair

member's,

and you will still receive the fixed payment "X"

(E$2. 04) .

IF YOUR SUBJECT NUMBER IS EVEN
If your column 3 total is greater than your pair member's by
26 or more, your receive fixed payment "X" ( E$2. 04) .
If your column 3 total is greater than your pair member's by
25,

a

fair coin will be flipped to determine whether you

receive fixed payment "X" (E$2.04) or "Y" (E$0.86).
If your column 3 total is greater than your pair member's by
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24 or less, you receive fixed payment "Y" (E$0.86).
If your column 3 total is less than your pair member's you
receive fixed payment "Y" (E$0.86).
NOTE:

You will receive fixed payment "Y" (E$0. 86) unless your

column 3 total is 25 or more greater than your pair member's
column 3 total.

Circle the appropriate fixed payment in

column 4, and subtract from column 4 the cost associated with
your

decision

number

listed

calculated

in

column

5.

Record

this

This amount in column 6 is your

difference in column 6.
earnings for the round.

in

The earnings of your pair member are

exactly the

same way.

After round one

completed, you will perform the same procedure.

is

That is, you

will choose a decision number again (though of course, you may
pick the same one) , you will open another envelope and record
your random draw number for the round, and you will calculate
a new payoff.

When round 10 is completed, add your earnings

from each of the rounds and record the total earnings at the
bottom of sheet 2.

Then divide by 2 and this will be the

amount that will be paid to you,

in cash, at the end of the

experiment.
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SUBJECT#_ _
SHEET 1 - DECISION COSTS TABLE
Column A Column B
Column A ColumnB
Column A Column B
Decision Cost of
Decision Cost of
Number Decision
Number Decision
Number Decision

Decisioe Cost of

0
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35

S0.0000
S0.0001
S0.0003
S0.0006
S0.001
S0.002
S0.003
$0.004
S0.005

S0.006
$0.007

S0.008
S0.010
SO.Oil
S0.013
S0.015
S0.017
S0.019
S0.022
S0.024
S0.027
S0.029
S0.032
S0.035
S0.038
S0.042
S0.045
S0.049
S0.052
S0.056
S0.060
S0.064
S0.068
S0.073
S0.077
S0.082

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50
51
52
53
54

55
56
57
58

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

$0.086
$0.091
$0.096
$0.101
$0.107
$0.112
$0.118
$0.123
$0.129
$0.135
$0.141
$0.147
$0.154
$0.160
$0.167
$0.173
$0.180
$0.187
$0.194
$0.202
$0.209
$0.217
$0.224
$0.232
$0.240
$0.248
$0.256
$0.265
$0.273
$0.282
$0.290
$0.299
$0.308
$0.317
$0.327
$0.336

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

98
99
100

$0.346
$0.355
$0.365
$0.375
$0.385
$0.395
$0.406
$0.416
$0.427
$0.437
$0.448
$0.459
$0.470
$0.482
$0.493
$0.505
$0.516
$0.528
$0.540
$0.552
$0.564
$0.577
$0.589
$0.602
$0.614
$0.627
$0.640
$0.653
$0.667
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Subject#_ _

SHEET 2 - PAYOFF RECORD SHEET
ROUND I
Col. 1
Col.2
Col.3
Decision Random TocaJ
Number Number 1 + 2

+

Col.S

Col.6

Col.4

X

Y

Amt.

Col.S

Col.6

Minus
Amt.

Total
Cost
Earned

Col.4

Col.S

Col.6

X
Y
Minus
Total
Amt. Amt.
Cost
Earned

ES2.04 ES0.86 -

ROUNDS
Col. I
Col.2
Col.3
Decisioo Random Total
Number Number I + 2

+

Col.4

X
Y
Minus
Total
Amt. Amt.
Cost
Earned

ES2.04 ES0.86 -

ROUND4
Col. I
Col.2
Col.3
Decisioo Random TocaJ
Number Number 1 + 2

+

Col.6

E$2.04 ES0.86 -

ROUND3
Col. I
Col.2
Col.3
Decision Random TocaJ
Number Number 1 + 2

+

Col.S

ES2.04 ES0.86 -

ROUND2
Col. 1
Col.2
Col.3
Decision Random TocaJ
Number Number 1 + 2

+

Col.4

X
Y
Minus
Total
Amt. Amt.
Cost
Earned

Col.4

x
Amt.

y

Col.S

Col.6

Minus
Amt.

Total
Cost
Earned

ES2.04 ES0.86 -
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ROUND6
Col. l
Col.2
Col.3
Decision Random Total
Number Number l + 2

+

Col.S
Col.6
Minus
Total
Cost
Earned
Amt.

Col.4

y

Amt.

Col.4
X

Y

Amt.

Col.S
Col.6
Minus
Total
Amt.
Cost
Earned

Col.4
X

Y

Amt.

Col.S
Col.6
Minus
Total
Amt.
Cost
Earned

E$2.04 E$0.86 -

ROUND 10
Col. l
Col.2
Col.3
Decision Random Total
Number Number l + 2

+

x

E$2.04 ES0.86 -

ROUND9
Col.3
Col. l
Col.2
Decision Random Total
Number Number l + 2

+

Amt.

E$2.04 ES0.86 -

ROUNDS
Col. l
Col.2
Col.3
Decision Randcm Total
Number Number l + 2

+

Col.S
Col.6
Minus
Total
Amt.
Cost
Earned

Y

E$2.04 E$0.86 -

ROUND?
Col.3
Col. l
Col.2
Decision Random Total
Number Number l + 2

+

Col.4
X

Col.4

x
Amt.

y

Col.S
Col.6
Minus
Total
Amt.
Cost
Earned

E$2.04 E$0.86 -

Sum of Total Earnings Rounds 1-10 ES_ _

Divide by 2 to get Net Earnings

$_ _
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DATE._ _ __

SESSION#_ __

Subject payments for experiments
conducted by JoAnnc E. Oucnnewig
Faculty Advisor: Tim Mason
PAYOUT RECORD SHEET

I I

NAME (PRINT)

I

SS or Student ID #

I

Payment

I

Signature

I

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

II

12
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POST EXPERIMENT SURVEY

Thank you for participating in this study.

Please feel free

to make any comments you have about the experiment, both good
and bad,

so that adjustments may be made

improved for future use.

Once again,

and

it can be

thank you for your

participation.
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